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Abstract 
 
This essay tries to put Simmel=s Theory of Money into the context of current discussions in 
economics concerning money. The essay has three parts. Part I looks at the contribution of Georg 
Simmel in its context, and offers remarks about the changing structure of economics as a discipline 
composed of many different sub-disciplines. It is argued that Simmel is able to transcend sub-
disciplinary borders, and to great benefit for today=s scholar. Secondly, a recent contribution to 
monetary economics is explained in transactions and property rights terms, since that is the only way 
to comprehend it and integrate it into the main stream of scholarly discourse, although the 
contribution has been made more in the context of post-Keynesian economics. Again, it appears that 
Simmel=s approach of transgressing inner disciplinary borders has merits even today. Thirdly, the 
perplexing phenomenon of European monetary integration is looked at with a similar perspective in 
mind. Here, the unifying concept is not monetary economics but constitutional political economy as 
the main cause to explain the peculiar features of European monetary integration. 
 
Key words: European Monetary Unit, social function of money, Simmel 
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MONEY AND ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONS 
 
This paper has been written in direct response to Wolfgang Drechsler=s AMoney as Myth and 
Reality@1, and its contribution lies in clarifying the status of Georg Simmel=s contribution to the 
Theory of Money. In economics, we typically emphasize three functions of money, money as a unit 
of exchange, money as a unit of account and money as a store of value. However, there are clearly 
other functions which money can perform in an economy and in society at large. Hence, the issue 
arises as to how to deal with the particularly economic functions just mentioned and those other 
functions within the same theoretical framework or, alternatively, if different theories have to be 
invoked, how to delineate these different theories one from the other. 
 
During a demonstration against the regime of president Milosovic, the angry crowd in Belgrave threw 
Dinar bills towards the presidential palace onto the street, protesting with a currency which, like the 
government had lost the public=s trust. Meanwhile, the printing presses of the central bank were 
turning out new bills with even higher denominations. 
 
Recently in Tehran we noticed the disdain with which people treat their money. There are now six 
thousands Rials to the US Dollar and the most common bill is a five thousand Rial note. However, 
people do not quote prices in Rials, rather the population has developed a parlance in terms of its 
own de-nomination of ten Rials or one Tumán. In oral dealings, all prices are quoted in Tumán. This 
is as if the general population were collectively ashamed and engaged in a cover up of the inflationary 
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policies of its religious leaders and government. At the moment, the highest de-nomination is a bill of 
ten thousand Rials, an otherwise pretty (and big) bill; when I first saw it, I instinctively wondered how 
I would feel as the head of state, depicted favourably on the bill, to have my portrait on such a 
worthless bill.2 When routine transactions are requiring carrying pilot cases around, the stage is set 
for strong sentiments toward money. These instances of anger (in Belgrave), shame and pride are not 
necessarily and closely related to the basic functions awarded money in economic theory, its use as a 
unit of exchange, as a unit of account and as a store of value, although, of course, they somewhat 
refer to these three functions. The function of unit of exchange is clearly impaired if pilot cases have 
to be carried around.3 When the population changes the colloquial de-nomination on its own central 
bank, this is clear evidence for the loss the currency has undergone of its function as a unit of 
account. While throwing bills on the street in protest does reveal a total dis-appearance of the 
function of store of value. Yet, anger, shame and pride, while connected to the basic functions of 
money depicted in economic theory, go far beyond those matters discussed in economics treaties, 
although they may still have eminently economic but also social and political re-percussions. 
 
It is the purpose of this article to deal with those re-percussions, yet not totally ignoring economic 
and socio-economic aspects including issues of public choice. To this end, the article has three parts. 
Part I deals with the contribution by Georg Simmel in his Philosophy of Money specifically in order 
to discuss its status with respect to economic theory. Part II takes up a different matter yet related to 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Paper prepared for presentation to the second Leangkollen workshop conference on 
AProduction Capitalism versus Financial Capitalism; an Evolutionary Perspective@. 
University of Oslo - SUM and Norsk Investorforum, 3-6 September 1998 
2 People remarked that the Mullahs just have no pride. 
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Simmel=s contribution. Here we deal with Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger=s recent 
contribution on the paradigm of money4; the third section is devoted to the phenomenon of the Euro, 
the common currency of the qualifying European Member States. Here, the issue is, of course, not 
an excess of instability but rather fears of an excessively stable currency. 
 
I. 
 
Prominently, immediately on the third page of his Philosophy of Money5. Simmel makes this point on 
how to understand his Aphilosophy@ of money, where Aphilosophy@ has a very special meaning 
as shall become apparent shortly. ANot one line in these explorations is meant to be a contribution 
to economics. By this I mean that the manifestations of valuation and purchase, of exchange and 
medium of exchange, of means of production and wealth, which economics treats from its point of 
view, are treated in this work from a different point of view. It is only the mere fact that the economic 
point of view is at the same time the practically most relevant, the most thoroughly explored and the 
most precisely modelled, that these three advantages have somehow created the notion that they are 
the economic facts as such. [yet] each exchange can with equal legitimacy be treated from a 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 When I lived in Chile under the Allende regime, I had a little black leather suitcase to keep 
the five hundred peso bills of which several where needed for a bus ride; my friends referred 
jokingly to my Amaletito magico@. 
4 Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, The Paradigm of Property, Interest and Money and Its 
Application to European Economic Problems; Mass Unemployment, Monetary Union and 
Transformation, Bremen: Institut für Konjunktur und Strukturforschung, Discussion Paper nr. 
10, July 1997. 
5 Georg Simmel, Philosophie of Geldes, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1930, 5; the book 
counts more than 585 pages in its fifth edition, see also the translation in English of the 
second edition under the title: Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, translation of the 
second, enlarged edition by T. Bottomore and D. Frisby with an introduction by D. Frisby, 
London/Boston: Routledge and Keegan Paul [1907], 1978, pp. XII + 512 
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psychological point of view, from the point of view of social and moral history or even be viewed as 
an aethetic fact.@ (p. VII) 
 
In order to translate this research program here sketched with just a few broad brushes, Simmel has 
organized his work into two main parts, an analytical part, providing the foundations and a synthetic 
part in which the different perspectives are then focussed onto a particular phenomenon or set of 
phenomena. The analytical part has three chapters dealing first with value and money, second with 
the value of money as a substance and thirdly with the functions of money. The second - synthetic 
part - of the Philosophy of Money has likewise three chapters. Chapter four deals with individual 
liberty, chapter five with the monetary equivalent of personal values and chapter six with the style of 
life. In these chapters of the second half of the book, Simmel, the great master of economic 
sociology, can show the extent to which drawing on different points of view, sets of evidence from 
largely differing bodies of literature and combining these different approaches and types of evidence 
synthetically into a common perspective focussing on a specific aspect of life, notably economic life, 
can bring insights necessarily outside the realm of monetary economics in both theory and empirical 
applications. This raises the question of whether Simmel=s contribution and work building on it can 
be considered part of economics at all. 
 
It is not quite superfluous to raise this question today. We could, of course, take an agnostic view 
and emphasize that Simmel=s Philosophy of Money has recently been translated into English and 
been reviewed by two leading monetary theorists in the leading journal of the profession, The Journal 
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of Economic Literature6. Actually, the very title of the article makes it clear that Laidler=s and 
Rowe=s treatment is intended only to give a partial rendition of what is seen by them as a more en-
compassing study. 
 
We could also take the slightly less agnostic view and point out that upon its appearance the study 
was immediately reviewed by the editor of the then leading journal in economics, Gustav Schmoller.7 
Even a synopsis of the study itself had appeared as a lead article in the same journal. Yet the very 
title of the journal, annual for legislation, administration and economics in Germany clearly reveals a 
broader scope than that of economic only, just as Simmel wanted to go beyond a purely economic 
point of view. When Simmel=s theories were discussed in Schmoller=s seminar at the University 
of Berlin, later published in the journal and in book form, to be revised through its several editions, a 
fundamental change took place in economics and the social sciences. Simmel himself is one of the 
founders of modern sociology, which became a separate discipline shortly after the book had been 
published and while it was going through its several editions. Hence, the boundaries of economics 
with its other neighbouring disciplines not only began to change due to the emergence of new ones; 
the more fundamental change took place as the boundaries of the old and new disciplines did not 
necessarily take up the entire realm of scholarship, creating overlaps and lacunae of territory that 
later nobody seemed to claim. To a certain extent, the work of German economists of the time, and 
notably those who where looking beyond purely economic questions became forgotten with time, 
since they no longer formed part of the core of the discipline as it developed. This is true for the 
                                                 
6 See David Laidler and N. Rowe, AGeorg Simmel=s Philosophy of Money; a Review 
Article for Economists@, Journal of Economic Literature, 1980, pp. 97-105 
7 Gustav Schmoller, ASimmels Philosophie des Geldes@, Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, 
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaften im Deutschen Reich, 25 (3), 1901, pp. 799-860 
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work of Werner Sombart, Max Weber, Georg Simmel but also for their American counterparts 
writing at the same time, as it is true for the contributions of Italian, French or British economists. As 
we are confronted with new problems, such as, for example, issues of the transformation of 
economies formerly belonging to the spheres of influence of the Soviet Union or as we are 
confronted by issues in relation with the common European currency which defy economic analysis 
proper, we are well advised to go back to those earlier studies which may contain hints that may be 
helpful today. Hence, it is by no means superfluous to re-claim those contributions to economics 
proper. Yet, where in the landscape of economics today should we place Georg Simmel=s 
Philosophy of Money? 
 
In order to answer this question, we first have to emphasize his peculiar use of the term philosophy. 
What he terms philosophy is a synthetic view of different aspects which do not form the basic issues 
of value, exchange and production. He is interested in questions that have to do, as he says, with the 
style of an economy, and this is an issue which needs to be discussed in the context of the sub-
discipline of comparative economic systems, with issues such as our ability to value life chances, loss 
of life or limb and the like, an issue arising in health economics, law and economics and cost-benefit 
analysis, or with problems around the organization of exchange when trust and knowledge is an 
issue, a matter squarely important for transactions cost analysis. Incidentally, I have just given a 
modern re-phrasing of the content of the last three chapters of the book, and it becomes immediately 
apparent that the contribution here goes to various current economic sub-disciplines, notably to 
public finance (JEL code: H, notably H43), health economics (JEL code: I, notably I12), law and 
economics (JEL code: K, notably K13) and economic systems (JEL code: P, notably P17). 
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It is obvious that this exercise can be continued as we go through the different contributions made by 
Georg Simmel, and that, by translating it back into the context of modern economic discourse, we 
are able to re-claim his work for the discipline today, if only we can show to the readers= 
satisfaction that the contribution is valid and important in addressing relevant problems of either 
economic history or current economic performance. 
 
II. The Paradigm of Property, Interest and Money 
 
Recently, two authors working at the University of Bremen published a study (in German) entitled 
AProperty, Interest and Money; Unsolved Puzzles in Economics@.8 The book, almost as 
voluminous as Simmel=s with its 544 pages, draws on a large body of evidence from many different 
disciplines, including economics, sociology and even ethnology. The basic suggestion of the book, 
however, can be readily stated. In quoting from an English summary, we read: AOur approach and 
the three major schools of economics [i.e. classical economics, neo-classical economics and 
Keynesianism] have to analyse one and the same economic system. They all explicitly concede the 
existence of money and interest and the necessity to explain these fundamentals. Moreover, they all 
make use of the term property. Our analysis will show that these three schools fail to re-comprehend 
the formative economic role of property. They resemble a fish which does not know of water before 
it is pulled out of it. None of them can grasp property=s unique capacities to back by its 
encumbrance and to serve as collateral. Yet it is this very capacity that a loan creates interest and 
                                                 
8 Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, Eigentum, Zins und Geld: Ungelöste Rätsel der 
Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Roohlt, 1996 
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money.9 Their basic proposition is correct and it could help if it played a major role in courses on 
monetary economics. Law and economics has not penetrated monetary economics to a great extent 
yet, and in this sense, the two authors at the University of Bremen have made a contribution. 
However, the contribution is relatively simple. The authors have simply re-invented the theory of 
property rights and applied it to understanding the role of money. Well, herein lies the twist of interest 
to both historians of economic thought and economists of monetary affairs (who seem sometimes to 
be given to creating a certain myth around the basic institution of money,) which through its three 
basic function creates the ability to transfer property not only at present times but also over time 
inter-temporarily and even across nations and generations. Herein lies the contribution of this basic 
property rights theory of money. 
 
What is puzzling is the belief of the two authors from Bremen that they have invented something new. 
Each contribution to the economics of property rights I have consulted has the same point. To begin 
with, in the New Palgrave Dictionaries of Economics and the Law, in the entry on property rights 
written by Harald Demsetz, we find the three crucial elements of property rights to have to be 
exclusive, alienable and presumptive rights. Alienability allows for the use as collateral and for it to be 
encumbered or re-partitioned.10 Similarly, in the selected readings edited by Svetozar Pejovich 
entitled The Economic Foundations of Property Rights11 we find the traditional differentiation of 
property rights in the three aspects of the right to use, the right to the fruit or usus fructors, and the 
                                                 
9 In Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger The Paradigm of Property, Interest and Money and Its 
Application to European Economic Problems: Mass Unemployment, Monetary Union and 
Transformation, Institut für Konjunktur und Strukturforschung, Discussion Paper nr. 10, 
University of Bremen, July 1997. 
10 Harald Demsetz, AProperty Rights@, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law, Peter Newman (ed.), London: MacMillan, 1998, vol. 3, p. 146 
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right to abuse or change a particular right, where the right of usus fructus allows for a piece of 
property to be used as collateral, the right of abuse the ability of encumbrance. This three fold 
definition of the property right has been part of Roman law for as long as it has been taught. Thirdly, 
in the reader by Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter entitled The New Institutional Economics: A 
Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics12, on page on page 
6 we find the same definition with the appropriate explanations. To quote: Athere are various 
categories of property rights; the right of ownership however is the best known. By general 
agreement, the right of ownership in an asset consists of three elements; (a) the right to use the asset 
(usus), (b) the right to appropriate the returns from the asset (usus fructus), 8 the right to change its 
form, substance and location (abusus). This last element, which amounts to the right to bear the 
consequences from changes in the value of an asset, is perhaps the fundamental component of the 
right of ownership. It implies that the owner has the legal freedom to transfer all rights (e.g., to sell a 
house) or some rights (e.g., to rent a house) in the asset to others at a mutually agreed-upon price. 
Effectively, the flexible right of transfer induces an owner to operate within an infinite planning horizon 
and, thus, to show concern for the efficient location of resources over time.@ (p. 6) 
 
This example shows, with remarkable clarity, that crossing sub-disciplinary boundaries in economics, 
as between monetary economics and law and economics, for instance, can yield substantial returns. 
Simmel=s synthetic view may not only be important for the reasons Simmel had in mind himself, it 
even shows up when we are trying to understand modern contributions to economics which 
somehow seem to fall, on the surface, outside our acquired patterns of recognition. 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997 
12 Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991 
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III. The European Common Currency 
 
One of the most remarkable recent developments concerning money on the surface has very little to 
do with its three fold function to serve as the unit of exchange, the unit of account and to store the 
value. The European common currency is above all a symbol of European unity, and the 
convergence criteria on which accession to the system depends do not bear directly on all three of 
these functions, as they emphasize public deficits, the accumulated public debt in relation to the 
national product and, this bears on the three functions somewhat directly, price stability of an 
acceeding country, yet again not in a strict sense. If we consider, for instance, the stability of the 
German currency, what is stable is, above all, its constant de-valuation. As a little boy, in order to 
send a postcard I could use a ten Pfennig stamp with the effigy of Martin Luther on it, to do the same 
now requires a one Mark stamp in an industry that should, over the last four decades, have been 
able to experience substantial productivity increases. In fact, even small monetary de-stabilisations 
do affect a multitude of market signals and therefore do dampen productivity growth. If we stand the 
acceptable productivity growth in an economy at one to two percentage points per year, and if we 
add other forms of real growth such as those due to the increase in the natural interest rate as a 
consequence of new markets becoming available, one is surprised that a zero rate of inflation is 
considered the ultimate sign of monetary stability, when in fact productivity growth should lead for at 
least some prices to fall, and, this not being off-set by productivity decline elsewhere, the price level 
as a whole should be expected to fall, which implies that a zero rate of inflation is not yet what can be 
considered price stability. Bearing this in mind, the discussion about the emergence of the European 
currency has been bewildering. It can be understood only by de-emphasizing the issue of money in 
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the sense of monetary economics and looking at different issues, in this particular case the attempt to 
put together elements of the emerging European constitution, in particular with respect to the role of 
the public sectors at the European level, the level of the Member States, the level of the constituent 
states of Member States, and the local level. 
We should keep this in mind, and look at the issue in its different dimensions. 
 
Although the Maastricht Treaty belongs to the set of documents which form part of an emerging 
constitution for the United States of Europe, little law and economics analysis has been devoted to its 
understanding. A central aspect of the Treaty is, of course, very much in the public eye. The 
introduction of the common European currency, the Euro, symbolizes13 the coming of age of 
European statehood, a symbol that will pass through the hands of Europeans as a matter of daily 
routine from the year of 2002 onwards. The third and revised edition of Paul de Grauwe=s The 
Economics of Monetary Integration14 offers a good introduction into the subject area which may 
form a solid starting point for serious law and economics analysis. 
 
1. The Convergence Criteria 
 
                                                 
13 The symbolic aspect of this mainly politically motivated venture should not be 
underestimated. Since the introduction of the Euro is primarily driven by political motives, 
economic considerations taking a back seat, a good grasp of the problem field is offered by 
Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, (1907)1930 (5). An 
English translation is available, Georg Simmel, Philosophy of Money, London: Routledge, 
1978. 
14 The Economics of Monetary Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-
19-877549-0 
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The transition to a Monetary Union (de Grauwe, 1997, 126-155) according to the Maastricht 
Treaty requires for a Member State that wishes to acceed to the Union meeting the five convergence 
criteria, to wit: 
1) The country=s inflation rate is not more than 1.5 % higher than the average of the three lowest 
inflation rates in the European monetary system; 
2) Its long term interest rate is not more than 2 % higher than the average observed in the three low 
inflation countries; 
3) It has not experienced devaluation during the two years preceeding the entrance into the Union; 
4) Its government budget deficit is not higher than 3 % of its Gross Domestic Product (if it is it should 
be declining continuously and substantially and come close to the 3 % norm, or alternatively, the 
deviation from the reference value (3 %) should be exeptional and temporary and remain close to the 
reference value (article 104, C (A)); 
5) Its government debt should not be exceed 60 % of Gross Domestic Product (if it does, it should 
diminish sufficiently and approach the reference value (60 %) at a satisfactory pace (article 104, c 
(b)). 
 
Astonishingly, at the end of February 1998, the eleven countries expected to join the European 
Monetary Union, thereby merging ten different currencies, were reported to have met the 3 % 
criterion, a remarkable feat when in 1995, the figure still stood at 4.6 %, in 1996 at 4.2 %, whereas 
the 1997 estimate stands at 2.8 % and the 1998 forecast even at 2.7 %. 
Taken together the five criteria provide a remarkable framework for a large market area with a 
common currency. The secular reduction in inflation rates and hence inflation expectation can be 
expected to foster both growth and productivity enhancements. The lower the inflation to be 
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reckoned with, the more precisely market signals can be taken into account, and the more 
extensively comparative advantages can be exploited through buying and investment decisions. The 
dramatic productivity decline in the United States during the eighties was attributed, as we recall, by 
many economists to high inflation, among other factors. Low long term interest rates at only 2 % 
above stable currency countries= bond rates should likewise be expected to favour long term 
investment, a factor that would help, in the long run, in re-building the former state socialist 
economies, at this point the five new federal states of Germany, but in the longer run also the 
economies of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. 
 
It should be noted that the constraints on the state budgets are compatible with very different 
economic styles.15 The convergence criteria are silent about the size of the public sector, a slim 
minimalist state is equally compatible as a baroque expansive public sector, as long as it is contained 
within the dual realm of the 60 % and 3 % criteria. Particularly, the 3 % criterion does not restrict 
public infrastructure investments as long as these investments can be expected to generate positive 
returns. If they do, off budget methods of financing are easily available, yet if they do not they cannot 
                                                 
15 The concept of Astyle@ of economic conduct is a key notion we owe to the historical 
school. It was used by Schmoller, Sombart, Spiethoff and Schumpeter, who took style as a 
term of economic sociology. In order to understand and correctly interpret economic 
phenomena, one may want to look at the leading ideas and convictions (spirit) to whic 
people subsribe and which will guide their actions; secondly at the techniques at their 
disposal; and thirdly at the organizational forms in which means and ends are combined or, 
alternatively, in which spirit and technique find their institutional realization. Spiethoff actually 
gives five categories, i.e. the economic spirit, the natural and technical resources, the 
constitution of society, the constitution of the economy, and the economic process. For 
details see Spiethoff (1932) or Schefold (1981, p. 113). The term Astyle@ should be 
taken as a technical term and not be read as the opposite of Asubstance@. Differences in 
economic style are a matter of substance indeed. 
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be accounted as investment but rather as consumption. Herein lies the deeper importance of the 
convergence criteria, as they reign in entitlements and other consumptive programs. 
 
2. A Point of Theory and History 
 
The approach taken with the Maastricht Treaty to bringing about a monetary union is by no means 
the only conceivable one. Economic theory would rather have pointed to a competition of different 
currencies with the most stable one emerging as the preferred one, i.e. a market decision would have 
taken place instead of a political one. In principle, a common market requires not a single currency, it 
is rather compatible with a large number of different competing currencies, as long as the different 
units of exchange can be compared through a common unit of account.16 
In fact, if we compare the project of the European Monetary Union with the German Monetary 
Union of 187117, it appears that the latter occurred much more according to the precepts of 
economic theory18. When the Reich was established, its twenty five constituant states enjoyed not 
only seven different currencies, but more importantly the Reich had two currency systems existing 
side by side, the gold standard and the silver standard. In late 1871, an act was passed 
Aconcerning the >minting of imperial gold coins=@. These coins were minted neither as thaler 
nor as guilders but rather as mark. In the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg, the Mark Banco 
had been used as a unit of account, but the leading currencies were the thaler in the northern states 
                                                 
16 See Leland Yeager, ADeregulation and Monetary Reform@, American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings, 75.2, 1985, pp. 103-107 with further references. 
17 In fact, in 1871 there was only the extremely modest beginning of a Reich prerogative in the 
Constitution. 
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including Prussia and the guilder in the southern ones. The act provided for only two coins, a coin of 
ten and of twenty Mark respectively. These coins became extremely popular, and thus emerged the 
new common currency. It took until 1873 for another act about imperial coins to be passed, and until 
1875 for an imperial central bank to emerge, which started its operation on January 1, 1876, being 
the former Prussian Central Bank. Yet surprisingly, only in 1909 was a pure gold standard finally 
adopted, i.e. during the longest part of the duration of the empire, from 1871 till 1909, there were 
two different currency standards. The coins and bills, by the way, in circulation in the empire, similar 
to what is to be expected in Europe, were allowed to bear the different state symbols such as the 
effigy of the respective sovereign of the constituant states, there being no less than four kingdoms 
among the twenty five states. 
 
Yet, there was one important difference between the German Currency Union and the European 
Monetary Union according to the Maastricht Treaty. The Central Bank of the empire was conceived 
as the house bank of the state, whereas the European Central Bank according to articles 104 and 
107 of the Treaty is totally independent from any public entity. The Treaty, in fact, provides for much 
more Central Bank independence than the German Central Bank act which can be amended by a 
simple majority of parliamentory votes. The status of the Imperial Bank (Reichsbank) also holds the 
key for understanding the two German hyper inflations which still cast their shadow into today=s 
monetary decisions. Both the first World War and the second World War were financed by 
debasing the currency. The German war chest in 1914 was sufficient for only two days of combat, a 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 See Karl Häuser, Deutsche Währungsunion nach 1871: Modell einer Europäischen 
Währungsunion?, Deutsche Bundesbank Auszüge aus Presseartikeln, Frankfurt, February 
20, 1997, pp. 4-9. 
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point well known and emphasized by German economists well ahead of time.19 In this sense, it can 
be said that the German hyper inflation of 1923 was caused by a decision taken in the fall of 1914, 
and the currency reform of 1948 was necessary as a consequence of the Reichsbank policies under 
Hjalmar Schacht despite the provisions of the bank act of 1926. 
 
                                                 
19 Josef von Renauld, Die finanzielle Mobilmachung der deutschen Wehrkraft, Leipzig, 1901. 
See also, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, The German Inflation 1914-1923. Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1986, pp. 108-109. 
 
 19
3. Devaluations and the Cost of the Monetary Union 
 
The cost of joining a monetary union, in economic theory are generally seen as consisting in two 
types; the loss of seignorage, i.e. the returns from issueing money, to the government for which a 
central bank operates as a house bank; and the inability to conduct economic policy through 
revaluations of the currency.20 There can, of course, be doubts about these theoretical arguments. A 
country with a booming export sector may, indeed, enjoy a temporary trade surplus with a trading 
partner, involving a trade deficit of the partner. The resulting change in relative prices, however, 
should ultimately also result in the second countries= ability to find offsetting comparatively more 
advantageous export products to the former country. From the point of view of the Maastricht 
Treaty, neither these macro-economic Acosts@ can be classified as such. It is the express purpose 
of the Treaty to prohibit the monetization of public debt, henceforth, and to dis-allow revaluations in 
order to strengthen the operation of the internal market in goods, services, capital and labour. 
Devaluations or revaluations stunt this development by frustrating consumers and investors in their 
purchasing choices. If to remain in the example just chosen, the export sector of the first country 
booms due to superior products, revaluing the currency of the exporting country or devaluing the 
currency of the importing country makes those preferred products more expensive, and artificially so, 
thus frustrating market forces. 
 
                                                 
20 This is extensively discussed in the first part of de Grauwe=s book, notably with reference 
to different labour market institutions, often with reliance on arguments involving a Phillips 
curve (e.g. p. 13) or wages that are sticky downwards. 
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4. Adjustment Problems  
 
Stable money is often said to require more than the appropriate institutional prescription such as 
those laid down in the Maastricht Treaty.21 In fact, the provision of article 105 is very explicit in 
assigning price stability as the uncompromisable goal of the Central Bank. Only Awithout 
prejudice@ to this goal shall the European Central Bank Asupport the general economic policies of 
the community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the community@ as laid down in 
article 2. In particular the rules of democratic accountability of the European Central Bank to other 
European institutions such as the Council, the Commission and the Parliament will constitute the links 
through which the broad political and social consensus will be transmitted into Central Bank 
decisions. In future law and economics research, it will be important to look precisely at the 
institutional details according to which this process of democratic accountability manifests itself. 
 
5. Democracy in Deficit22 
 
More than twenty years ago, James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner published their analysis of 
Athe political legacy of Lord Keynes@ calling for constitutional norms to re-establish sound fiscal 
principles. Despite serious efforts, no practical way has been designed in the public choice litarature 
                                                 
21 For instance, the president of the German Central Bank, on February 11 in a lecture at the 
University of Cologne, expressed this point like this: stable money requires in particular the 
support by a broad political and social consensus. Many factors beyond monetary policy, for 
instance the expenditure and boaring behaviour of the participating states or the wage policy, 
in the long run will influence the value of the currency. See Hans Tietmeyer, Die Geldpolitik 
der europäischen Zentralbank, Deutsche Bundesbank, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln, February 
13, 1998, p. 1. 
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to build a political consensus that would provide for effective constitutional principles that could 
achieve this purpose. It is easy to show, for any specific proposal of a constitutional amendment, 
how it can be circumvented by a willing majority of Congress. It must come as no small surprise that 
the intricate procedure established by the Maastricht Treaty in order to accomplish the project of the 
European Monetary Union has seemingly turned out to be that very political path through which the 
re-instatement of fiscal discipline has been accomplished, at least by approximation and at least for 
the time being, with even Greece missing the 3 % criterion by only one percentage point, and four 
democracies (of Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) reporting deficits for 1997 at less than 1 
%. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This essay provides an introduction into Georg Simmel=s Theory of Money. Simmel explores the 
social functions of money. With the help of his theory we can understand symbolic issues and 
behaviour in relation to money, recent attempts to provide a property rights theory of money and 
aspects of the introduction of a common European currency which do not reflect the three main 
functions of money as a unit of account, a unit of exchange or a store of value. 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 See James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit, New York: 
Academic Press, 1977. 
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